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JoHNSTON

v.

CITY oF CLAREMONT

[49 C.2d

[L.A. No. 24247. In Bank. Mar.

PHILIP F. JOHNSTON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
CI'l'Y OF CLAREMONT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

Municipal Corporations-Referendum-Zoning Ordinances.-A
rezoning ordinance that amends a general zoning ordinance of
a general law city is subject to referendum. (Const., art. IV,
§ 1.)
Statutes- Legislative Power- Referendum.- The power of
referendum may be invoked only with respect to matters that
are strictly legislative in character.
Counties-Boards-Powers.-A board of supervisors in granting a permit under a zoning ordinance acts in an administrative capacity.
Zoning-Amendment of Zoning Laws.-A zoning ordinance
constitutes the exercise of a governmental and legislative function and is subject to change by the legislative power. (Gov.
Code, § 65804.)
Statutes-Amendment.-The amendment of a legislative act is
itself a legislative act; the power to legislate includes by
necessary implication the power to amend existing legislation.
Zoning-Amendment of Zoning Laws.-Rezoning of use districts or changes of uses and restrictions within a district can
be accomplished only through an amendment of a zoning ordinance and the amendment must be made in the same mode as
its original enactment. (Gov. Code, § 65804.)
Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Amendments.Where a city council amends a zoning ordinance so as to exclude from a particular zone property previously included in
such zone, its act in amending is legislative, not administrative.
Zoning - Amendment of Zoning Laws.- Under Gov. Code,
§ 65804, the changing of property from one zone to another

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Initiative, Referendum and Recall, § 28.
[4] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp., Zoning, § 40; Am.Jur., Zoning,
§ 169 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: (1, 9, 10, 12] Municipal Corporations,
§ 253(2); [2] Statutes, § 34; [3] Counties, §55; [4, 6, 8, 13] Zoning, § 5; [5] Statutes, § 73; [7] Municipal Corporations, § 156;
[11] Municipal Corporations, § 253; [14) Municipal Corporations,
§ 152; [15, 16] :tv1unicipal Corporations, § 145; [17, 19] Municipal
Corporations,§ 160; [18] Municipal Corporations,§ 152; [20, 23-25]
Municipal Corporations, § 144; [21] Municipal Corporations,
§244.5; [22] Statutes, §10; [26] Easements, §14.
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must be
an ordinance am,endmlgo the original
ordinance.
[9] Ivlunicipal
and Referendum-Zoning
Ordinances.-No objection, such as that procedural steps required to be taken after the adoption of an ordinance providfor street improvements would be circumvented if the
were subjected to either the initiative or the referexists with
to
a
ordinance to
since
steps
by the
Legislature in such case must be taken before the adoption of
the ordinance; on the other hand, the objection would apply
where a zoning ordinance was adopted by a general law city by
means of an initiative measure without compliance with the
general law relating to zoning.
[10] !d.-Referendum-Zoning Ordinances.-The legislative body
of a general law city cannot validly adopt a zoning ordinance
without complying with the zoning act, and where it has complied with the requirements of the act the ordinance is subject
to referendum.
[11] !d.-Referendum-Scope of Power.-Whenever a city council
acts in its legislative capacity, the action it takes is subject
to the constitutional right of referendum unless such action
falls into one of the exceptions provided for in the Constitution.
[12] !d.-Referendum-Zoning Ordinances.-The right of referendum with respect to zoning ordinances is essential for the protection of the rights of the electors of each city; what is done
with respect to one piece of property of necessity has an effect,
good or bad, on adjacent or nearby property.
[13] Zoning-Amendment of Zoning Laws.-Where the wording of
zoning ordinances must be changed in order to accomplish a
desired revision, the act is legislative, not administrative; but
where a regulation is changed pursuant to an existing ordinance permitting an administrative variance on the finding of
certain facts, the act is administrative.
[14a, 14b] Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Reasonableness.-The zoning of plaintiffs' boulevard property for residential and agricultural use in a general zoning ordinance was
not unreasonable, oppressive, arbitrary or discriminatory in the
light of the trial court's finding that the highway conditions
in front of such property rendered its boulevard frontage more
reasonably usable and suitable for commercial purposes than
for residential or agricultural purposes, that substantially all
the property contiguous to and for some distance east and
west along the boulevard was zoned for business, and that next
to plaintiffs' property there was a reservoir, water well and
pumping plant which for many years had been used for com·
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mercial
of reasonableness of the
ordinance was
there was a reasonable basis for
the action of the zoning authorities.
[15] !d.-Zoning Ordinances-Legislative Discretion and Court
Review.-Although the courts will inquire whether a zoning
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the decision of the
zoning authorities on matters of opinion and policy will not
he set aside or disregarded
the courts unless the regulations
have no reasonable relation to the public welfare or unless the
physical facts show that there has been an unreasonable, oppressive or unwarranted interference with property rights in
the exercise of the police power.
[16] Id. - Zoning Ordinances- Legislative Discretion and Court
Review.-The wisdom of the prohibitions and restrictions in a
zoning ordinance is a matter for legislative determination, and
though a court may not agree with that determination it will
not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authorities
if there is any reasonable
for their action.
[17] Id.- Zoning Ordinances- Appeal-Conclusiveness of Findings.-The findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance are not binding on an
appellate court if the record shows that the question is debatable and that there may be a difference of opinion on the
subject.
[18] !d.-Zoning Ordinances-Reasonableness.-Exercises of the
police power are apt to have an adverse effect on property
interests, and the fact that some hardship is experienced or
that it may be more profitable to make other use of the property, or that the property would be more valuable if it were
commercially zoned, is not controlling in determining whether
the zoning regulations are arbitrary or unreasonable.
[19] Id.- Zoning Ordinances- Appeal- Scope of Review.-The
function of a reviewing court in a zoning ease is to determine
whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of
the zoning authorities, and if the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable the legislative determination will not
be disturbed.
[20] !d.-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-A city ordinance purporting to rezone a portion of plaintiffs' property from residential
to commercial was not validly enacted where the procedure for
redistricting, set forth in the original ordinance and followed
in the new one, was in conflict with the state law at the time
the new ordinance was adopted, and where subsequent to the
adoption of such ordinance there was no act validating any
zoning ordinance.
[21] Id.- Ordinances- Validation of Invalid Ordinances.-The
purpose of a validating act is not to validate an ordinance the
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provisions of which are in conflict with the general law of the
state covering the same subject matter, but to declare in effect
that though such ordinance was not adopted in accordance with
the procedure outlined by a general law of the state, as to that
particular ordinance there has been substantial compliance
with such
and therefore such ordinance shall be
deemed to have been validly adopted the same as though there
had been exact compliance.
[22] Statutes-Curative Acts.-Validating acts operate retroactively only and confer no validity on subsequent acts.
[23] Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-The
fact that a city ordinance purporting to rezone a portion of
plaintiffs' property from residential to commercial was adopted
under a procedure authorized by a prior ordinance does not
give it validity where such ordinance, insofar as the procedural requirements are concerned, is contrary to a specific
declaration of the Legislature that the statewide policy is that
a local legislative body should hold a public hearing before
adopting substantive changes in a zoning ordinance; to give
such force to a validating act is not reasonable, since it would
be interpreting a validating act to say that any subsequent
state law enacted on the subject should have no effect on any
city which, prior to adoption of the validating act, had enacted
an ordinance contrary to such later enacted state legislation,
as long as sueh ordinance remained in effect.
[24] Id.-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-To read into a statute
declaring that any ordinances passed pursuant to a zoning
law or conservation or planning act the exception that all cities
would be exempt from certain provisions thereof as long as
having previously enacted an ordinance contrary to the statute
such ordinance remained in effect would prevent it from having
a uniform application, and thus the statute would be unconstitutional. ( Const., art. I, § 11.)
[25] Id.-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-Since the Legislature has
determined that as a matter of public policy there must be a
hearing before the local legislative body on any ordinance
changing the permitted use of property within the city, such
policy must apply equally to all cities within the same class.
[26] Easements-Creation-By Express Grant.-Where a grant
deed by which plaintiffs gave defendant city an easement over
their property provided for automatic defeasance should a
certain zoning ordinance be repealed or suspended or otherwise
not take effect, and where, on referendum, a majority of the
voters determined that it should not become effective, the deed
granting the easement was invalid by its terms.
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APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Donald R. Wright, Judge pro tern.'-~ Judgment reversed;
for leave to produce additional evidence and for Supreme Court to make additional findings, denied.
Action for
relief with
to a zoning ordinance. Judgment
that ordinance rezoning ~laintiffs'
property as commercial property was valid, reversed.
Harry R. Roberts for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
William G. Bergman, Jr., City Attorney, Burke, Williams

& Sorensen, Harry C. Williams and Royal M. Sorensen for
Defendants and Appellants.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, Roger Arnebergh,
City Attorney (Los Angeles), and Bourke Jones, Assistant
City Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and
Appellants.
McCOMB, J.-Plaintiffs and defendants appeal from a
judgment in a declaratory relief action which held that an
ordinance of the city of Claremont rezoning plaintiffs' property as commercial property was valid.
Plaintiffs' property is located on the southwest corner of
Foothill Boulevard and Mountain A venue in Claremont, extending 959 feet in a westerly direction along the south side
of Foothill and 569 feet in a southerly direction along the
west side of Mountain. Most of it is planted in citrus trees,
but on the northeast corner there are a reservoir, water well,
and pumping plant, which have been used for many years
for commercial purposes.
The northern and western borders of plaintiffs' property
constitute the boundaries between Claremont and land which
is unincorporated territory of Los Angeles County.
Foothill Boulevard is a widely travelled highway. The
unincorporated area on both sides of the highway for a distance
of several miles has been zoned C-1 by the county, a zoning
which permits commercial establishments such as retail stores,
gasoline stations, and restaurants. A great deal of such land
is being devoted to commercial uses. 'fhe property on the
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieial Council.
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south side of Foothill
west of plaintiffs' prop·
erty is
used for a trailer sales business.
property on the south, there is a subNext to
stantial area which has been zoned R-1 (single family residence) by the
of Claremont. The eastern side of Mountain
is zoned residential for several blocks north and south of
Foothill. East of Mountain on Foothill there is no commercial
zoning for over a block and no commercial use for about two
blocks.
According to the latest estimate available at the time of
trial, Claremont had a population of about 9,000. A downtown area of approximately six square blocks is zoned for
C-2 (commercial) uses. In addition, a four-block strip on
Foothill, principally on the southern side, has been zoned
commercial since 1953. There is evidence that only a few
lots are vacant in either of these commercial zones, but single
family residences are located on more than two square blocks
of the downtown area.
Although one real estate appraiser who had investigated
the area testified that in his opinion a profit of $38,600 could
be realized from subdividing plaintiffs' property for residential purposes under a plan providing for lots which would
back onto Foothill, another one testified that in his opinion
such a subdivision would result in a loss of $7,800.
A zoning consultant for the city of Claremont and other
cities was of the opinion that the city was essentially residential in character and that there should be no more commercial use permitted on the south side of Foothill. There
was also testimony to the effect that the city has zoned 50
per cent more land for commercial purposes than the size of
the population would indicate is currently needed, and, in the
opinion of a zoning expert, an excess commercial zoning of
25 per cent to 30 per cent is a reasonable amount for future
expansion. Other testimony, however, was to the effect that
there should be twice as much commercial zoning as is necessary at present.
CHRON'OLOGY

i. In 1951 defendant city of Claremont, a sixth class city,
adopted a general zoning plan, ordinance Number 441, under
the general law. Plaintiffs' property was zoned for agricultural and residential use.
By the terms of the general zoning ordinance as originally
adopted, a public hearing was required to be held by the
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planning commission on any
for redistricting, but
none was expressly
by the ordinance to be held
thereafter by the city council.
ii. On May 3,
plaintiffs filed a request with the city
council for a change in the zoning of their property from
a residential zone to a commercial zone. A public hearing
was held by the planning commission, and thereafter the
commission referred plaintiffs' request, without recommendation, to the city council.
iii. On June 1, 1954, without further public notice, the city
council adopted ordinance No. 503, purporting by its terms to
rezone a portion of plaintiffs' property from a residential to a
commercial zone. A week later and without notice to plaintiffs,
the city council purported to adopt an emergency measure,
ordinance No. 504, reciting that the general zoning ordinance
did not conform to the Government Code of the State of California and providing that ordinance No. 503 be repealed.
Ordinance No. 503 was never published as required by law.
iv. On July 29, 1954, the city council, by ordinance Number
507, amended the general zoning ordinance Number 441 to
require a public hearing by both the planning commission and
the city council on applications for rezoning.
v. On September 21, 1954, after the effective date of ordinance No. 507, plaintiffs filed a second request for the rezoning
of their boulevard frontage to a depth of 300 feet. This application was referred to the planning commission, which held a
public hearing on October 19, 1954, but the commission failed
to act upon the application within the 40-day period prescribed by ordinance No. 441, as amended by ordinance No.
507, resulting in an approval by operation of law of plaintiffs'
application.
vi. On December 6, 1954, the city council held a public
hearing upon plaintiffs' application.
vii. On December 14, 1954, defendant city adopted ordinance No. 513, the effect of which was to rezone plaintiffs'
boulevard frontage property from an R-1 zone (single family
residence) to a C-2 zone (commercial).
viii. Concurrently with the adoption of ordinance No. 513
rezoning plaintiffs' boulevard frontage, plaintiffs delivered
to the city a grant deed conveying a 20-foot easement over the
most easterly portion of their boulevard frontage for the
widening of Mountain A venue, which deed provided for the
automatic defeasance of the grant should ordinance No. 513
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be repealed or suspended or otherwise not take effect according to its terms. The city council accepted this grant deed
according to the terms thereof.
ix. About January 3, 1955, there were filed with the city
clerk referendum petitions signed by 829 registered voters of
the city, entitled ''Referendum Petition Against Ordinance
No. 513 Redistricting Certain Property in the City of Clare·
mont Located at the Southwest Corner of Mountain A venue
and Foothill Boulevard From an R-1 Zone (single family
residence) to a C-2 Zone (heavy commercial)."
x. Pursuant to said referendum petition, a special election
was held May 3, 1955, to submit to the electors the question
of whether ordinance No. 513 should be approved.
xi. On May 10, 1955, after a canvass of the returns it was
determined that a majority 1 of the voters had voted against
the adoption of ordinance No. 513.
xii. On August 5, 1955, plaintiffs instituted the present
declaratory relief action seeking to have it held that ordinance
No. 513 was valid.
xiii. After trial, the court found :
(a) That ordinance No. 513 complied in all respects with
the requirements of the general zoning law of defendant
-eity and with state law; that it was not subject to referendum
under the laws of the State of California; and that as a necessary corollary plaintiffs' deed to the city was a valid and subsisting grant of an easement;
(b) That the highway conditions in front of plaintiffs'
property rendered its boulevard frontage more reasonably
usable and suitable for commercial purposes than for residential or agricultural purposes; that substantially all the property in the county contiguous to and for some distance east
and west along Foothill Boulevard was and had been zoned
for business; and that next to plaintiffs' property there were
a reservoir, water well, and pumping plant which for many
years had been used for commercial purposes;
(e) That ordinance No. 503 was invalid because it was
not adopted in conformity with the requirements of state
law then in effect ; and
SOf the ballots east in per110n, the eleetion was fo11Dd to be a tie,
with 1153 votes for the ordinanee and the same number against, but
when the 44 absentee ballots were counted. •rdinuee N.. Ill wu
d.teated by a mareba of 84 Yok&.
.C.M-11

DEFENDANTS' APPEAL

r·ezon:1ny ordinance that amends a genthe sixth class (general law
are here "1''~-'''"••"'-"'
Constitution reserves the referendum power to the
including the voters of cities without charters, with
certain
not
to the
case. (Cal.
Const., art.
[2] 2. The power of referendum may be invoked only with
respect to matters which are strictly legislative in character.
(Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 125, 129 [1] [222 P.2d 225];
Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 511 [3] [253 P. 932] ;
Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal.App. 561, 568 et seq. [153 P. 397].)
[3] 3. A board of supervisors in granting a permit under
a zoning ordinance acts in an administrative capacity. (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal.2d 66, 74 [6] (187 P.2d
686] ; Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 614, 623 [3]
(213 P.2d 492).)
[4] 4. A zoning ordinance constitutes the exercise of a
governmental and legislative function and is subject to change
by the legislative power. (Gov. Code, § 65804; 8 McQuillin,
•section 1 of article IV of the Constitution provides, in part: "The
second power reserved to the people shall be known as the referendum.
No act passed hy the Legislature shall go into effect until 90 days after
the final adjournment of the session of the Legislature which passed
such act, except acts calling elections, acts providing for tax levies or
appropriations for the usual current expenses of the State, and urgency
measures necessary for the immediate preservation of the publie peace,
health or safety, passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected
to each house.
"· .. provided, however, that no measure creating or abolishing any
offiee or changing the salary, term or duties 'If any officer, or granting
any franchise or special privilege, or creating any vested right or interest, shall be construed to be an urgency measure....
"The initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby
further reserved to the electflrs of eaeh county, city and county, city
and town of the State to be exercised under such procedure as may
b6 provided by law. . . . Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed as affecting or limiting the present or future powers of
cities or cities and counties having charters adopted under the provisions of Section 8 of Article XI of this Constitution...• This section
is self-executing, but legislation may be enaeted to facilitate its operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either tAe prov.isiou Of
this seetioD or the powen llerein reservecl."
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ing, § 25.245, p. 594 4 ; Blotter v.
[6] [270 P.2d 481] .)
[7] We must therefore determine
city council act in an administrative

must be made in the
(Gov.
§ 65804 :
ed. rev. 1957), Zon42 Cal.2d 804, 811

: Did the

capacity in adopting ordinance No. 513?

In view of the
it is evident that the amendment of legislation is
legislative in character and
that where, as here, the council amends a zoning ordinance so
as to exclude from a particular zone property previously included in such zone, its act in amending is a legislative act
and not an administrative aet.
It is to be noted that this is an
different situation
from one in which a zoning ordinance confers upon the council or an official the power to
an easement or variance
in a particular case. (See Johnston v. Board of S1tpervisors,
supra; Essick v. Oity of Los
[8]
section 65804 of the Government Code5 pro'In 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
ed. rev. 1957), Zoning,
\125.65, p. 145, it is said: "· .. a zoning
constitutes an ex·
ercise of a governmental and legislative function and, hence, is subject
to change by the legislative power."
'In 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. rev. 1957), Zoning,
§ 25.245, p. 594, it is said: "Generally, rezoning of use districts or
~henges of uses and restrictions within a district can be accomplished
only through an amendment of the zoning ordinance, and the amend·
ment must be made in the same mode as its original enactment. Amend·
ments are subject to limitations set by the general law or charter, and
the amendment of such ordinances must be enacted as prescribed.
Generally. the amendment can be effected
by an ordinance enacted
by the municipal legislative body, ani!
by a mere resolution or
order."
•section 65804 of the Government Code reads: "Except as otherwise
provided in this article, an amendment to a zoning ordinance which
amendment changes any property from one zone to another or imposes
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vides that the changing of property from one zone to another
must be accomplished by an ordinance amending the original
ordinance.
This conclusion is in accord with the views expressed by
this court in several previous decisions. In Dwyer v. City
Council, 200 Cal. 505, 515 [253 P. 932], we said: "A zoning
ordinance as amended becomes in effect a different ordinance.
Even if it be granted that a reclassification of an area as
c;mall as that involved in the instant case cannot be said to
effect a new scheme, the same rule must necessarily be followed as would be applied if a larger area had been reclassified, and it may be observed that a piecemeal rezoning of small
areas may result in a plan differing in vital particulars from
that originally contemplated."
In Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 341
[5] [175 P.2d 542], it was held that whether an area of general use within a zone of limited use should be expanded was
"clearly within the discretion of the legislative body of the
city."
In Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 460 [2]
[202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990], Mr. Chief Justice Gibson,
speaking for this court, said : "In enacting zoning ordinances,
the municipality performs a legislative function, and every
intendment is in favor of the validity of such ordinances.''
(Italics added.)
[9] It has been held that referendum is not available in
street improvement cases. (Chase v. Kalber, 28 Ca1.App. 561,
573 et seq. [153 P. 397] ; Starbuck v. City of Fullerton, 34 Cal.
App. 683, 684 et seq. [168 P. 583]; St. John v. King, 130 Cal.
App. 356, 366 et seq. [20 P.2d 123].) However, it should be
noted that the Legislature has prescribed procedural steps to
be taken after the adoption of an ordinance providing for
street improvements, which steps would be circumvented if
the proceedings were subjected to either the initiative or the
referendum. (Chase v. Kalber, supra, at p. 573 et seq.) But
no such objection exists with respect to subjecting a zoning
ordinance to the referendum, since the procedural steps prescribed by the Legislature in such a case must be taken before
the adoption of the ordinance. On the other hand, the objection would apply where a zoning ordinance was adopted by a
any regulation listed in Section 65800 not theretofore imposed or removes or modifies any such regulation theretofore imposed shall be
initiated and adopted in the same manner as required for the initiation
and adoption of the original zoning ordinance.''
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general law city by means of an initiative measure without
compliance with the general law relating to zoning. It has
been held that an ordinance adopted under such circumstances
was void for that reason. (Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207
Cal. 134, 140 [5] [277 P. 308].)
It was pointed out in the Hurst case, supra, at page 140 [4]
et seq., that the electors of a city or county can adopt under
the initiative law only such ordinances as the legislative body
thereof would have had the power to enact. (See also Blotter
v. Farrell, 42 Cal.2d 804, 810 [5] [270 P .2d 481].) [10] Clearly, the legislative body of a general law city could not validly
adopt a zoning ordinance without complying with the zoning
act. Where such body has adopted a zoning ordinance, complying with the requirements of the act, there is no reason
not to subject the ordinance to referendum. This principle
was recognized in the Hurst case, supra.
There the proponents of the initiative measure relied
upon Dwyer v. City Council, supra, and in answer to their
contention this court said, at page 142: "The question of the
operation of the initiative law to such local legislation was
not involved in the Dwyer case and therefore no necessity
arose to distinguish between the effectiveness of the initiative
and the referendum in zoning cases. If the point were involved it would undoubtedly be conceded that had the board
of trustees of the City of Burlingame adopted a zoning ordinance as provided by the statute, its final action would be
subject to the referendum provisions of the constitution and
laws of the state, for the obvious reason that there is embodied
in the enactment of a zoning ordinance such elements of legislative action as to subject the ordinance when adopted to the
reserved legislative power of the electors of the city, when
properly invoked, to approve or reject it." (Italics added.)
[11] Whenever the council acts in its legislative capacity,
the action it takes is subject to the constitutional right of
referendum unless such action falls into one of the exceptions
provided for in the Constitution.
[12] The right of referendum with respect to zoning ordinances is essential for the protection of the rights of the
electors of each city. A zoning ordinance can and does have
a more direct and lasting effect upon property values and
property owners within a city than almost any other type of
ordinance. What is done with respect to one piece of property of necessity has an effect, good or bad, upon adjacent
or nearby property.

C.2d

section
ordinance that ,ll,,,.u,<e"
shall be initiated

made between the council's act
amendments therean amendment to a
""'"""''"~" from one zone to another
the same manner as an

not administrative.
regulation
is changed pursuant to a
eAJL<>Vllll-: Ordinance
an administrative variance upon the
of
certain facts, the act is administrative.
v. Gregg,
90 Cal.App.2d
363 [7]
P.2d 37] .)
Therefore, since defendant ci1
adopting ordinance
No. 513, was amending the
ordinance to change
certain property from one zone to
it was acting pursuant to its inherent power to amend its legislative act and
thus was acting in a legislative capacity. As it was acting
in a legislative capacity in
the ordinance, the ordinance was subject to referendum.
PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL

[14a] Questions: First. Was the zonin.g of plaintiffs' boulevard property for residential, and agricultural use in the general zoning ordinance No. 441 unreasonable, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory, in the light of the kial court's
finding (b), supra?
No. [15] It is settled that, although the courts will, of
course, inquire as to whether a zoning ordinance is arbitrary
or unreasonable, the decision of the zoning authorities as to
matters of opinion and policy will not be set aside or disregarded by the court01 unless the regulations have no reasonable relation to the public welfare or unless the physical facts
show that there has been an unreasonable, oppressive, or unwarranted interference with property rights in the exercise
of the police power.
[16] The wisdom of the prohibitions and restrictions is
a matter for legislative determination, and even though a court
may not agree with that determination, it will not substitute
its judgment for that of the zoning authorities if there is
any reasonable justification for their action. (Lockard v.
()ity of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [202 P.2d 38, 7
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et seq.

.)
the trial court found that the
way conditions in front of
rendered its
boulevard
more
suitable for
commercial purposes than for residential or
poses and that
all the
and for some distance east and west
was zoned for business.
conclusions of the trial court as to the reasonableness of a
zoning ordinance are not
on an appellate court if
the record shows that the question is debatable and that there
may be a difference of opinion on the
(Lockard v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 462 [6].)
Giving
due consideration to the basic physical facts appearing in
the record, such as the character of plaintiffs' property, the
nature of the surrounding territory, the use to which each
has been put, and recent trends of development, we have
concluded that the question of the reasonableness of the ordinance was debatable and that there was a reasonable basis
for the action of the zoning authorities.
[18] Even assuming, however, as would be justified from
the record, that plaintiffs' property would be more valuable
if it were commercially zoned, such factor would not be determinative. As was said in Lockard v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, at page 466 et seq. : ''Exercises of the police power
.•. are apt to have an adverse effect on property interests,
and the fact that some hardship is experienced or that it may
be more profitable to make other use of the property is not
controlling in determining whether the regulations are arbitrary or unreasonable.'' [19] Furthermore, in view of our
conclusion that there was a reasonable basis for the action
taken, the rule is applicable as stated in the Lockard case,
supra, at page 462, where it is said that in cases of this kind
"the function of this court is to determine whether the record
shows a reasonable basis for the action of the zoning authorities, and, if the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly
debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed."
[20] Second. Was ordinance No. :J03
enacted?
No. Ordinance No. 441 was
17, 1951. It set
forth a procedure for redistricting, which procedure was followed in adopting ordinance No. 503. This procedure was iu
conflict with the state law in effect at the time ordinance No.
503 was adopted.

840

JOHNSTON

v.

CITY OF CLAREMONT

[49 C.2d

I.n 1951 (Stats. 1951, ch. 1690, p. 3897) the following was
enacted by the Legislature : "Any ordinance or amendment
thereto passed pursuant to the Zoning Law of 1917 or the
Conservation and Planning Act or its predecessor, is hereby
confirmed, validated and declared legally effective." This
validating act is part of section 14 of chapter 1690, which
amended the Zoning Law of 1917.
In 1953 (Stats. 1953, ch. 1355, p. 2929) there was enacted
by the Legislature the following : "Any ordinances passed
pursuant to the Planning Act, the Conservation and Planning
Act, such Article 4 [Article 4, Chapter 10, Part 2, Division 3,
Title 4 of the Government Code], or its predecessor, prior to
the effective date of this act, are continued in force until
repealed pursuant to law." This validating act is section 4
of chapter 1355, which chapter enacted the now effective
provisions relating to the adoption of zoning ordinances by
general law cities. Such provisions were also in effect at the
time of the adoption of ordinance No. 503.
Subsequent to the adoption of ordinance No. 503,
there has been no act validating any zoning ordinance.
Plaintiffs contend that by virtue of the validating acts
of 1951 and 1953, all provisions of ordinance No. 441, regardless of whether they were contrary to the provisions of
the Zoning Law of 1917, the 1947 Planning and Conservation
Act, or the 1953 act relating to zoning, were declared valid
and effective insofar as the city of Claremont was concerned
and superseded the general law on that subject, and that since
ordinance No. 503 was adopted under a procedure authorized
by ordinance No. 441 it was validly enacted.
[21] The purpose of a validating act is not to validate
an ordinance the provisions of which are in conflict with the
general law of the state covering the same subject matter.
The purpose of a validating act is to declare, in effect, that
although such an ordinance was not adopted in accordance
with the procedure outlined by a general law of the state,
the Legislature, as to that particular ordinance, declares that
there has been substantial compliance with said provisions and,
therefore, such ordinance shall be deemed to have been
validly adopted the same as though there had been exact
compliance.
[22] Validating acts operate retroactively only and confer
no validity upon acts subsequent thereto. (50 Am.Jur. (1944),
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Statutes, § 481, p. 504; People ex rel. Wangelin v. Pitcairn,
371 Ill. 616 [21 N.E.2d 753, 755] .)
[23] If plaintiffs' position were adopted, it would give
to a validating act a prospective operation. Under such a
theory, ordinance No. 441, insofar as the procedural requirements are concerned, could remain effective forever even
though the Legislature specifically has declared that the statewide policy is that a local legislative body should hold a
public hearing before adopting substantive changes in a
zoning ordinance. To give such force to a validating act is
not reasonable, as it would be interpreting a validating act
to say that any subsequent state law enacted on the subject
should have no effect upon any city which prior to the adoption of the validating act had enacted an ordinance contrary
to such later enacted state legislation, as long as such ordinance remained in effect. Under such an interpretation,
there would be implied in the act of 1953, which is the current
act relating to zoning, a provision that this act should apply
to all general law cities of the State of California except those
cities previously having enacted ordinances contrary to the
provisions of this act.
[24] To read into the 1953 act the exception that all cities
previously having enacted an ordinance contrary to the provisions of the act would be exempt from certain provisions
thereof as long as such ordinance remained in effect would
prevent it from having a uniform application, and thus the
act would be unconstitutional. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; State
ex rel. Keefe v. Mcinerney, 63 Wyo. 280 [182 P.2d 28, 37];
Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Cal. 434 [192 P. 40].)
To read such an exception into the 1951 act would have the
same effect.
[25] Since the Legislature has determined that as a matter
of public policy there must be a hearing before the local legislative body on any ordinance changing the permitted use of
property within the city, such policy must apply equally to
all cities within the same class. There is no reason either in
law or otherwise for defendant city of Claremont to be treated
differently in this respect from any other general law city
within the state. Therefore, no zoning ordinance adopted by
the city of Claremont after the effective date of the current
act relating to zoning is valid unless a hearing thereon before
the local legislative body was held, as required by that act.
Admittedly, no such hearing was held with respect to ordi-

defeasance of
pealed or
otherwise not take effect according
to its terms. Therefore, since ordinance No. 513 was subject to referendum and a
of the voters determined
that it should not become
the deed which plaintiffs
an easement over their propgave to defendant
erty was invalid by its terms.
APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFFS FOR LEAVE
TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiffs have filed an
for leave to produce certain additional evidence and have requested this court to make
certain additional
However, in view of the conclusions reached
it is unnecessary to take additional evidence or make
The judgment is
and plaintiffs' application for
leave to produce additional evidence and
this court to make
additional findings is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor,

and Spence, J., concurred.

CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Assuming ordinance No. 513 which placed a portion of
plaintiffs' property in a commercial zone (it had formerly
been in residence and
zone) was properly subject
to a referendum, I believe that plaintiffs' constitutional rights
have been invaded by
to them of the basic ordinance No. 441 which zoned their property for residence and
agriculture. Plaintiffs'
lies along Foothill Boult>vard, a highway which is not in
corporate limits of Clare-
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'Nhatsoever;
Boulevard travels in
than five miles imBoulevard Frontage ;
the intersection thereof
with :Mountain A venue is in a restricted
zone and is
limit
of
miles per hour;
that the said traffic conditions upon said Foothill Boulevard
render
said
more
suitable and usable for
uses and purposes, as
authorized and
the terms of said
than for any other
use or purpose. . . .
"That it is true:
is now, and
has been for
vehicular traffic
gases; that said fumes,
a large volume of
odors and gases emitted from said traffic upon Foothill Boulevard have
increased over the years; that as a
direct and
consequence of said
and
emitted from said
the citrus trees
the
of

poses
Boulevard
C-2 commercial uses and purposes, as such uses and purposes
are authorized and
in a C-2 Zone
the Zoning
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as amended, than for any other use or purOrdinance No.
pose.
''That it is true: that the property west of Mountain A venue
on the northerly side of Foothill Boulevard and across from
plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage, to a depth . . . (300)
feet from the northerly side of Foothill Boulevard, is in the
unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles and
the same is in a C-1 Zone under the terms of said Los Angeles
County Basic Zoning Ordinance No. 1494; that said County
C-1 Zoned property on the north side of Foothill Boulevard
is presently planted to lemon trees and was formerly a part
of a large citrus grove extending northerly thereof; that said
northerly balance or remainder of said former citrus grove
is presently being subdivided for single family residences and
such balance is presently owned by different owners than the
persons owning said County C-1 zoned property; that said
County C-1 zoned property across from plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage is more reasonably suitable for commercial
purposes than any other use or purpose and the same is
being presently held by the owners thereof for sale for commercial uses and purposes . . . that there is no real or substantial difference between said property on the north side
of Foothill Boulevard west of Mountain Avenue and plaintiffs'
said Boulevard Frontage and by reason thereof plaintiffs'
said Boulevard Frontage is more reasonably suitable and
usable for C-2 commercial uses and purposes, as such uses
and purposes are authorized and permitted in a C-2 Zone
by the terms of Zoning Ordinance No. 441, as amended, than
for any other use or purpose. . . .
"[T]hat the property, to a depth of ... (300) feet, situated
in the unincorporated area of the County of Los Angeles
and lying on both the northerly and southerly sides of Foothill
Boulevard for a distance of several miles immediately westerly
from plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage, is zoned for C-1 uses,
as such uses are defined and permitted by the terms of said
Los Angeles County Basic Zoning Ordinance No. 1494, as
amended, and a substantial portion of such C-1 property is
actually used for said C-1 uses; that the property immediately
west of and adjoining plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage has
been for several years, and now is, used for the sale of new
and used automobile trailers, all of which have been, and
now are, exhibited for sale by outdoor display on said property
under and pursuant to a special permit or exception granted
to the owners thereof by the Regional Planning Commission
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of the County of Los Angeles . . . that in addition to said
trailer sales business there are other commercial and business
uses presently being made and carried on upon the property
lying on the south side of said Foothill Boulevard between
plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage and San Antonio Avenue
on the West, all of which business uses are in the unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles and in the
same block as plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage, to wit, a
gasoline filling station, a restaurant and a liquor store and
that by reason of such uses and business being presently made
and carried on, said property on the south side of Foothill
Boulevard between plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage and
said San Antonio Avenue has a predominantly commercial
character and aspect; that there is no real or substantial difference between said property in said unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles and plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage and the said zoning of such other property,
and the uses to which the same is put, as aforesaid, render
plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage more reasonably suitable
and usable for commercial uses and purposes as authorized
and permitted in a C-2 Zone by the terms of said Zoning
Ordinance No. 441, as amended, of defendant City, than for
any other use or purpose.
"That it is true: that at all times since about the year
1895 the northeast corner of plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage at the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Mountain
A venue, consisting of a parcel of land of approximately 160
feet by 160 feet, both of said measurements being taken from
the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Mountain A venue,
has been, and now is, known as the 'Reservoir Site'; that
since about the year 1895 said 'Reservoir Site' has been used
for a commercial purpose, to wit : for a reservoir for the
storage and distribution of water for a number of users ; . . .
that in addition to said reservoir there has been since about
the year 1930, and there now is, a water well and pumping
plant upon said 'Reservoir Site' for the commercial production
of water; ... that said The North Palomares Irrigation Company has been at all times since 1930, and now is, engaged
in the business of producing and distributing water originating
from said well and pumping plant to numerous customers
and users; that said well and pumping plant emit noises in
the pumping of water from said well, which noises can be
heard a distance of approximately 160 feet away; that the
aforesaid reservoir upon said 'Reservoir Site' provide an

'' 'rhat it is
erty
said Boulevard
that the use of
any third
''That it is true : that the said Downtown Business District
of defendant City,
zoned for C-2 purposes
the
terms of
Ordinance No.
mcludes an
area of
one
one-half
bounded on
the north by 4th Street and on the
3rd Street and
on the west
Alexander Avenue and on the east
the
alley one-half block east of Yale Avenue. in which one and
one-half blocks
all of the
is developed
and improved with residences
a service station on
the northeast corner of 3rd and Yale Avenue ; that the remammg
of said Downtown Business District is substantially completely occupied
stores and business buildof
50 feet or
all
ings on lots of a
of which are owned
numerous owners thereof with only
three small vacant lots therein that the
surrounding
and immediately adjoining said Downtown Business District
is substantially all built upon with residences and other
buildings; that plaintiffs do not own the
upon which
plaintiffs conduct their said automobile
business
and plaintiffs lease the same from two different landlords .... ''
Summarizing.
' property
not usable for either
residential or
purposes ; it is surrounded by
commercially used property ; there is no room for expansion of
commercial projects in the commercial zone in Claremont
under ordinance No.
hence the business now there is
granted a
on the business activities in the community. Such constitutes a
of property without due
process of law and is unconstitutionaL Plaintiffs are left
with property which is worthless because they cannot use it
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ordinance

uses
of Claremont
Not only do
after
ordinance
there was no reasonable basis for having
for residential and agricuJtural uses, when the
authorities of Los Angele!<
County zoned all of the
around
mercial. Thus such cases as Lockard v,
33 Ca1.2d 453
P.2d
7 A.hR.2d
. are not in point.
In fact they support the conclusion I have reached as it is there
said: " ... that
when reasonable in object
and not arbitrary in
constitute a justifiable exercise of police power."
v. City of Los Angeles, supra,
33 Cal.2d 453,
Under the
in the Lockard
case the class in which
' property was zoned was
arbitrary and capricious and its reasonableness is not ''fairly
debatable." The
time it was considered in the sense
that a
was held was when ordinance No. 513 was
passed which
as commerciaL
There was no
the referendum election and
the close vote on the matter showed that the question was
more than "
debatable." The
court must, as
Lockard says, "look
" the results of that election and
determine the reasonableness of the zoning, giving consideration to the "character of the
" the "nature of
the surrounding territory," the "use" to which it has been
put and the "recent trends of
" All those
factors point to
one conclusion here : The property has
; the rvidence
no use or value for
shows this without
so found. It is
aptly said in
196 Cal. 211, 2113
is not
under the
segregating it to a
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to business establishments and enterprises already situated
in unrestricted districts. (In re White, 195 Cal. 516 [234
P. 396] .) " In Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d
332, 340 [175 P.2d 542], it is said that zoning ordinances
are invalid "Where the restrictions create a monopoly,"
''Where the use of adjacent properly renders the land entirely unsuited to or unusable for the only purpose permitted
by the ordinance," (emphasis added) and "Where a small
parcel is restricted and given less rights than the surrounding
property, as where a lot in the center of a business or commercial district is limited to use for residential purposes,
thereby creating an 'island' in the middle of a larger area
devoted to other uses.'' While Lockard and Wilkins upheld
the validity of the zoning there, they did not involve a case
such as we have here, where the use of the adjacent property
renders the land unsuited for the limited uses imposed by
the zoning. A case closely in point is Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213 [93 P.2d 93]. There plaintiff's property
was, as here, zoned residential, but it was near a large cannery which emitted noise and on a highway carrying heavy
traffic and ''As described by the appellant, his property consists of five acres upon which he had prune trees at one time.
These trees were removed because of the insects which came
over to them from the piled boxes of the cannery across the
street, and there is now nothing on it but a barn and a
house worth about $1,000." (P. 215.) Similarly, here we
have the noise and the lessened value of the property for
agricultural uses. Holding the ordinance invalid the court
said (p. 216): "Considering all the facts shown by the record,
it clearly appears beyond question that the land owned by the
appellant is entirely unsuited for residential purposes. The
adjoining cannery with the continuous noise which must
necessarily result from twenty-four hour operation, creates
a situation similar to that which is found in the industrial
part of a great city. Certainly no one wants to live next door
to a large factory, and the question whether any consideration
of public health, peace, safety or general welfare justifies the
continued restriction upon the appellant's property which
prohibits its use for commercial purposes is not fairly debatable. In its application to the land owned by the appellant,
the ordinance is void." (Emphasis added.) The identical
facts appear in the case at bar.
I would therefore affirm the judgment on the ground that
ordinance No. 441 is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs'

Mar.1958]

EPLEY

v.

CALIFRO

849

£49 C.2d 849: 323 P.2d 9U

property. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to deter·
mine whether ordinance No. 513 rezoning plaintiffs' property
to commercial uses was subject to referendum or otherwise
valid and effective.
Shenk, J ., and Schauer, J ., concurred.
The petition of plaintiffs and appellants for a rehearing was
denied April 23, 1958. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J.,
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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